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Abstract 
Mental time travel is the ability that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards 
in time to remember past events (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards in time to imagine future 
events (i.e., future thinking). Despite empirical evidence showing that animals might possess 
mental time travel abilities, some still claim that this ability is uniquely human. Recent debates 
have suggested that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism (i.e., ability to represent the sense 
of past and future) that makes mental time travel uniquely human. Advances in the field have 
been constrained by a lack of comparative data, methodological shortcomings that prevent 
meaningful comparisons, and a lack of clear conceptualizations of the temporal cognitive 
mechanism. Here I will present a comprehensive review into mental time travel in humans and 
animals—with a particular focus on great apes. I will examine three of the most prominent and 
influential theoretical models of human mental time travel. Drawing on these accounts, I 
suggest that a basic way of understanding time might be shared across species, however culture 
and language will play a critical role at shaping the way we elaborate mental representations 
about past and future events. 
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Time is always moving forward. However, humans can remember past events (e.g., 
our last holiday), and imagine and plan for events that have not happened (e.g., our next job 
interview); that is, we can mentally travel back into our past (i.e., episodic memory) and our 
future (i.e., future thinking). A crucial feature of the ability to mentally travel backwards and 
forwards in time is the temporal mechanism—the experience of being aware of “… the 
temporal dimension of their own and others’ existence…” –referred to as chronosthesia 
(Tulving, 2002; p. 313); that is, the ability to represent the sense of past and sense of the future. 
Mental time travel (henceforth MTT) has a significant impact on humans’ ability to survive 
(e.g., identifying future threats, like global warming) and also accounts for fundamental aspects 
of human culture (e.g., morality, law, religion; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
Are humans the only animal species that can mentally travel in time? Or do we share 
this capacity with other animals? Debates on this issue have mainly focused on whether animals 
possess the self-knowing (autonoetic) awareness that accompanies human recollection. This 
has led comparative research to a deadlock since it is empirically intractable if animals (and 
preverbal children) have this type of consciousness. The debate has recently been resumed by 
some arguing that it is the temporal cognitive mechanism of MTT that makes this ability 
uniquely human.  
 This present review will build upon this renewed approach to address the research 
questions concerning the uniqueness of MTT. Since some of the most controversial evidence 
for MTT has come from work with great apes, I will exclusively focus on the research carried 
out in our closest relatives and I will contrast it to the research conducted with humans. I first 
provide a general overview of what episodic memory and future thinking entail. Next, I review 
the research on MTT using non-verbal tasks in great apes and humans and I highlight the 
shortcomings of this research. Finally, I describe and provide a critical view of three theoretical 
models of human MTT that have directly dealt with the temporal cognitive mechanism of this 
ability. My ultimate goal is to show that comparative work on MTT must move away from the 
study of the mental aspect of this ability and, instead, focus on the temporal aspect of MTT.  
 
1. Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Future Thinking 
In the study of memory, one of the most influential distinctions is between semantic 
and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972). Semantic memory was originally defined as our 
database of knowledge about the world (e.g., winters in Scotland are cold). In contrast, episodic 
memory was considered to receive and store information about temporally structured events, 
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along with the spatiotemporal relations between them (i.e., what happened, where, and when). 
Tulving gradually (Tulving, 1983, 2005) refined the defining contents of these memory 
systems, referring to episodic memory as a memory system allowing us mental travel 
backwards in time, implying a sense of past. 
Tulving (2005) also argued that the adaptive function of episodic memory lies, not only 
in the keeping of records of the past, but in what it can offer to present and future decision 
making for humans and other animal species (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Future thinking 
is a highly adaptive cognitive ability that allows individuals to mentally pre-experience future 
events and needs and act in the present to address them (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 
2010). Ample evidence from both psychology and neuroscience indeed shows that the episodic 
system is involved both in re-constructing past events and thinking about the future 
(Suddendorf, 2010). During the past two decades, there has been an extraordinary increase in 
the number of studies on MTT in humans (e.g., Atance, 2015; Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 
2017; Zhang, M. & Hudson, 2018 for reviews). There has also been a push to develop methods 
to test MTT in young children because, for example, thinking about the future is argued to be 
a fundamental component of planning, delaying gratification, and anticipating the future 
consequences of one’s behaviour (e.g., Atance, 2015; Hudson, Mayhew & Prabhakar, 2011). 
Studying its development is also crucial for refining theories about the defining features of 
episodic cognition. This research has shown that the ability to recall past events and think about 
future events improves substantially between ages 3 and 5 (e.g., Hudson et al., 2011; 
McCormack & Atance, 2011).  
However, a comprehensive understanding of MTT can only be achieved by 
investigating whether and to what degree humans and non-human animals (henceforth animals) 
possess such capacity. Comparative studies are informative in this regard. In the last 20 years, 
comparative psychologists have provided empirical evidence that other animals besides 
humans remember the content of past events (i.e., what, where and when something happened) 
and possess some type of future thinking abilities (e.g., Templer & Hampton, 2013). These 
findings have been the focus of arduous debates—with some claiming that MTT abilities in 
animals are similar to those in humans (e.g., Clayton, Bussey & Dickinson, 2003; Osvath & 
Martin-Ordas, 2014) and others arguing that even the strongest pieces evidence of MTT 
animals can be acknowledged to be no more than (associative) learning achievements (e.g., 
Suddendorf & Coballis, 2007; Hampton, 2018).  In the next section, I describe the main non-
verbal approaches developed to test episodic memory and future thinking in animals. I also 
describe how these paradigms have been adapted to test MTT in humans.  
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2. Main Non-Verbal Experimental Approaches to the study of Mental Time Travel  
2.1. Episodic Memory: The What, Where and When Paradigm  
2.1.1. Great apes 
Based on Tulving’s (1972) original definition of episodic memory, Clayton et al. (2003) 
developed the behavioural criteria for studying episodic memory in animals. In their 
experiment (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) cached 
preferred, but perishable, wax worms and less-preferred, but non-perishable, peanuts. When 
recovering their caches, scrub-jays searched for worms if only a short time had passed, but 
switched to peanuts if a long time had elapsed since caching. Thus, birds successfully recalled 
“what” (i.e., type of food), “where” (i.e., its location), and “when” (i.e., how long ago).  
Martin-Ordas, Haun, Colmenares and Call (2010) adapted the what, where and when 
paradigm (hereafter WWW paradigm) for use with great apes. In their first experiment, Martin-
Ordas et al. (2010) tested whether chimpanzees, orangutans and bonobos could remember the 
location of their preferred but perishable food (i.e., frozen juice) and of their less preferred but 
non-perishable food (i.e., grapes) after 5 min and 1 hour. The results showed that great apes 
were able to remember what, where and when by selectively choosing the perishable food after 
5 min and non-perishable food after 1 hour. Additionally, Martin-Ordas and colleagues also 
showed that the what, where and when components were integrated into a single memory. In 
their experiment, subjects witnessed two different baiting events—each  baiting event involved 
hiding frozen juice and a grape- separated by 1 hour. Five minutes after the second baiting 
event, apes could choose two times in succession—one choice per table. If apes encoded the 
baiting events into integrated what–where–when structures, they should preferentially choose 
the frozen juice in the table baited last but the grape in the table baited first. This is what Martin-
Ordas and colleagues found. These results suggest that great apes could flexibly distinguish 
between two similar baiting events (see Dekleva, Defour, de Vries, Spruijt & Sterck, 2011 for 
negative results).  
A critical concern with the WWW paradigm is that it does not assess the autonoetic 
consciousness component of episodic memory. For this reason, Clayton and Dickinson (1998) 
refer to them as “episodic-like memories.” Importantly, animals’ performance in this paradigm 
has been interpreted as drawing on semantic memory—rather than episodic memory. This is 
because one could remember what, where and when something happened without having a 
personal recollection a past event (e.g., remembering when I was born; Suddendorf and Busby, 
2003; however see Martin-Ordas, Atance & Caza (2014) for a review on episodic and semantic 
memory and the thin line that separates these memories).  
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2.1.2. Humans 
Studies have shown that in WWW paradigms human adults recall what, where, and when 
something happened (e.g., Cheke & Clayton, 2013; Craig et al., 2016; Easton, Webster, & 
Eacott, 2012; Holland & Smulders, 2011; Mazurek, Bhoopathy, Read, Gallagher, & Smulders, 
2015; Pause, Jungbluth, Adolph, Pietrowsky, & Dere, 2010; Plancher, Gyselinck, & Piolino, 
2010). In these studies, participants are usually asked to recall, for example, in which room 
(e.g., Craig et al., 2016; Holland & Smulders, 2011) or quadrant of a computer screen (Pause 
et al., 2010) (i.e., “where”) and in which order (i.e., “when”) coins (e.g., Craig et al., 2016; 
Holland & Smulders, 2011) or visual stimuli (Pause et al., 2010) (i.e., “what”) were hidden or 
seen before. Similarly, Hayne and Imuta (2011) used a hide-and-seek procedure with 3- and 4-
year-olds to test at what age children remember what (i.e., 3 different toys), where (i.e., 3 rooms 
in which the toys were hidden) and when (i.e., order in which the 3 rooms were visited when 
hiding the toys). Their findings showed that whereas 4-year-olds succeeded at recalling what, 
where and when, 3-year-olds struggled to remember the order in which the rooms where visited 
when hiding the toys (i.e., when component). Crucially, successful performance in these tasks 
has been interpreted as evidence that the WWW paradigms rely on episodic memory. Since 
participants in these tasks can verbally report their episodic experience together with their 
memory for the what, where and when, the inference is that animals might also be relying on 
these episodic recollections in the WWW paradigms.    
2.2. Future Thinking: The Spoon Test 
2.2.1. Great apes 
The experimental approach to study future thinking across different species has mainly 
relied on the use of the Spoon test (Tulving, 2005). This test is based on the following scenario: 
A young girl dreams that she is at a party where all the guests are being served chocolate 
pudding. To eat the pudding, the young girl needs a spoon, but she does not have one. That 
night, she falls asleep while holding a spoon. Bringing the spoon represents an instance of 
future thinking because it implies envisioning a need that will occur in the future.   
Based on the spoon-test paradigm, Mulcahy and Call (2006) presented orangutans and 
bonobos with an out-of-reach reward and with a set of useful and useless tools, which they 
could take into a waiting room. To obtain the reward, subjects had to return to the room where 
the out-of-reach reward was placed, carrying the useful tool, either 1 or 24 hours after having 
seen the reward. Mulcahy and Call showed that great apes saved tools for the future. However, 
Suddendorf and colleagues (Suddendorf, 2006; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) suggested that 
an alternative explanation is that subjects experienced a desire for the reward throughout—
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indicating that thinking about the future was not required to succeed in this task. In addition, 
Suddendorf and colleagues argued that simple associative learning could explain their results. 
This is because over the trials, subjects could have learned an association between the tool and 
the reward; therefore no foresight might have been involved in their decision to take and 
transport the tool. 
Osvath and Osvath (2008) addressed some of the criticisms aimed at Mulcahy and 
Call’s (2006) study. Osvath and Osvath (2008) also presented chimpanzees and orangutans 
with a tool-use task, in which the selection, saving, and transportation of a tool was required to 
succeed. Their findings showed (1) that apes disregarded an immediate small, but highly liked, 
reward in favour of the appropriate tool that would give access to the future larger reward; (2) 
that the functional tool was not selected merely on the basis of being an associatively learned 
stimulus, but rather on its functionality; and (3) that apes selected the correct tools, but this 
tools were never encountered before. Altogether they concluded that great apes were engaging 
in planning behaviors for the future by outcompeting current drives and mentally pre-
experiencing an upcoming event. Importantly, Osvath and Osvath’s results are very difficult to 
explain by appealing to associative learning mechanisms alone (see Suddendorf et al., 2009, 
for a critical review; see Osvath, 2010, for a response). 
2.2.2. Humans  
The Spoon test has also been successfully implemented in developmental studies. For 
example, Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) presented children with a locked box that had a 
triangular keyhole. In a different room and after 15 min children were told that they were going 
to go back to the first room. Then, children were asked to select one of four keys to take with 
them. Suddendorf et al. (2011) found that whereas 4-year-old children could successfully select 
the correct key to solve the future problem (e.g., unlock the box to obtain the sticker), 3-year-
olds failed to do so (see Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Atance, Low & Clayton, 2015; Atance & 
Sommerville, 2014; Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013; Scarf, Gross, Colombo & Hayne, 2013; for 
similar results using the Spoon test). Using a similar paradigm, Scarf et al. (2013) showed that 
3-year-olds were also successful at bringing a key back to a location where there was a locked 
treasure box—note that in this case successful performance was determined by the length of 
the delay between being presented with the problem and the object selection phase (see also 
Atance & Sommerville, 2014 for similar findings on how memory—rather than future 
thinking- seems to driving performance in the Spoon test paradigms).  
Since then, several studies have used different variants of the Spoon test to assess future 
thinking in children (e.g., Atance & Sommerville, 2014; Cuevas, Rajan, Morasch, & Bell, 
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2015; Dickerson, Ainge, & Seed, 2018; Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010). Overall, all these 
studies typically show an age-related improvement in the Spoon test between ages 3 to 5.  
3.  Key issues 
3.1. Are the paradigms assessing the past and the future at all? 
(i) WWW paradigms. The temporal cognitive mechanism is not consistently 
addressed across the tasks designed to test the recollection of past events. For example, 
different authors have argued about the need to include (or not) temporal information  when 
testing episodic memory. There is no doubt that temporal information helps to dissociate 
between two similar memories. However, when this information is not available, humans use 
contextual cues to differentiate between events (e.g., going to the same restaurant twice with a 
different friend; Friedman, 1993).  
Accordingly, some authors have suggested that the concept of WWW should be 
broadened to test the recollection of contextual cues—so-called what-where-which paradigm 
(Eacott & Norman, 2004; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott, Easton & Zinkivsky, 2005). Eacott 
and Norman (2004) and Eacott et al. (2005) developed an experimental paradigm to test if rats 
remember what happened, where, and in which context an event happened. The general 
procedure consisted of presenting rats with 2 novel objects placed in an E-shaped maze. In 
order to create two different contexts, the maze was covered either with a dark cloth or with a 
wire mesh. Importantly, the objects were placed in different positions in each of the two 
contexts and subjects could not see the objects from the entrance. Subjects were exposed to 
both contexts and were habituated to one of the two objects. Since rats have a natural preference 
for novel objects, authors expected rats to go to the area containing the non-habituated object. 
Rats remembered what was where in which context the objects were placed. Eacott and 
colleagues suggest that one of the strengths of their procedure is that it requires no training and, 
therefore, reduces potential confounds caused by reinforced learning (Eacott & Norman, 2004). 
Furthermore, the recollection of the combination of object, location and context is unexpected 
(Kouwenber et al., 2012). Thus, by using what-where-which rather than what-where-when, 
Eacott and colleagues seem to have demonstrated recollection of episodic (like) memory in 
rats (Eacott et al., 2005).  
Cheke and Clayton (2010) have argued that “replacing ‘when’ with ‘which’ gets closer 
to the phenomenology of human episodic memory—in which the ‘when’ element is often 
inaccurate or even absent but the rich context is central” (page 917). However, as the authors 
also mention, even though “episodic-like memory of an event need not entail the recollection 
of ‘when’ it occurred, this element is necessary to behaviourally confirm that memory is for a 
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specific episode rather than for timeless facts about the spaces or objects involved in that 
episode” (page 917-918).  
(ii) Spoon Tests. One concern with the Spoon test methodologies is the extent to 
which individuals need to think about a future event to make a successful choice. In these tasks, 
selecting the correct item may only indicate that children know that, for example, the key is 
useful for unlocking the box now without having to represent its use in a future event (Hudson 
et al., 2011; McCormack & Hoerl, 2011; Martin-Ordas, 2018). This is because the correct 
choice for the future is the same as for the present moment. This possibility has been addressed 
in a recent study in which a two-step “spoon test” was developed (Martin-Ordas, 2018). In this 
task, children had to think about the order in which two events could happen in the future. 
Specifically, to secure a future need (e.g., play with a marble run game), children first had to 
obtain a key that allowed them next to access the marbles. By the age of 4 children selected the 
key; however, it is only by the age of 5 that children selected the key and reasoned about the 
temporal sequence of future events (i.e., they indicated the correct order in which they had to 
visit the rooms so they could obtain the marbles to then play with them in the marble run). 
These findings suggest that by asking children to reason about event order they could well be 
thinking about the future and that item-choice measures alone—as the ones in the Spoon test- 
might not involve future thinking.  
In addition, recent studies have highlighted that performance in the Spoon test is 
drastically affected when children are asked to spontaneously generate the solution to a 
problem rather than selecting a tool from a number of options (e.g., Moffett, Moll, & 
Fitzgibbon 2018; Atance et al. 2019)—also questioning the idea Spoon tests involve thinking 
about a future event. The results of these studies indicate that it is only by the age of 5 that 
children consider and start to generate the solutions for a future problem*. Also relevant for the 
 
* Along the same lines, in the two-step Spoon test, Martin-Ordas (unpublished data) found similar 
results. In this task, 3-, 4- and 5-year olds were asked to select a tool (e.g., a key to unlock the box with the 
marbles) and put it inside a bag for a future use (e.g., play with a marble run). The delay between experiencing 
the problem and allowing children to use the tool was 15 min. After the delay, the experimenter asked children  
“Are you ready to come upstairs [i.e., where the problem had previously been presented] with me?” If the child 
did not spontaneously remember to grab the bag with the tool, E said “Is there anything you need to bring 
upstairs with you?” The results showed that only 14% of the children spontaneously remembered to bring the 
bag back where the problem had previously been presented. Age had no effect on children’s performance 
(c2=1.40, df=2, p=.495). In particular, 12% of 3-year olds, 13% of 4-year olds and 33% of 5-year olds 
remembered to spontaneously bring the bag. It is possible that to perform correctly in the spontaneous question, 
children not only had to generate the content of the rooms (i.e., marble run and marbles locked in a box) and the 
future goal (e.g., play with marble run) but also plan accordingly (e.g., bring the bag with the tool). This is in 
contrast to the prompted question, in which it could be argued that the experimenter directed children’s attention 




present review is Dickerson et al.’s (2018) study in which children, after seeing a specific 
problem, were presented with two high-value objects. Critically, whereas one of the objects 
could be used to solve the previously-observed problem, the other object could not. Children 
younger than 5 years of age failed to choose the correct object for the task. The study highlights 
the possibility that the associate strength of the objects is at play in the Spoon test tasks. 
Recently, Redshaw and colleagues (2016) developed what they called “a minimalist” 
procedure to investigate great apes’ and children’s abilities to prepare for two mutually 
exclusive possibilities of a future event. Note that this is not a Spoon test paradigm, however 
the task was designed to test future thinking—as  such this study is relevant for what it is being 
discussed in this Section and what it will be discussed in Section 4.2. In the task, a reward 
could fall from one of two possible openings in either an inverted Y-shaped tube (Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2016) or two parallel tubes (Suddendorf, Crimston & Redshaw, 2017). According 
to the authors, if children and apes could anticipate the uncertainty of the future outcomes, then 
they should place their hands to cover both openings to ensure they catch the reward. Their 
results showed that 4-year-olds covered both openings, whereas 2-year-olds and apes failed to 
do so. These findings raised the possibility that the ability to anticipate and plan for uncertain 
future outcomes is uniquely human. Lambert and Osvath (2018) argued that the paradigm 
developed by Redshaw and colleagues is not valid because when dropping two rewards—one 
in each tube- apes do not cover both openings. Thus, rather than not anticipating uncertain 
outcomes, apes might find it difficult to synchronize the actions of their hands or attend to two 
locations/tubes simultaneously (Lambert & Osvath, 2018). Note that this same explanation 
could account for younger children’s performance in Redshaw and colleagues’ task. However, 
follow-up studies showed that, at least, younger children performed much better when two 
balls were dropped at the same time and, therefore, with certain outcomes—indicating that 
young children’s difficulties with the original task were related to the uncertainty of the 
outcome rather than to their ability to coordinate their hands (Redshaw, Leamy, Pincus, & 
Suddendorf, 2018; Suddendorf, Watson, Bogaart, & Redshaw, 2019).  
 An important issue with this paradigm is that it is not clear what it is truly measuring 
(e.g., McCormack & Hoerl, accepted); that is, subjects could cover both openings  (a) because 
they lack the knowledge about where the ball is going to fall (i.e., uncertainty about the task), 
or (b) because they understand the uncertainty of the future. There is, however, a clear 
difference between the two options. Whereas the first one involves children not having the 
knowledge concerning the outcomes of the task (i.e., epistemic uncertainty),  the second option 
implies understanding the availability of the these possible outcomes as happening in the 
 11 
future. Thus, this minimalist paradigm fails to fulfil one of Suddenforf and Corballis’ (2007) 
crucial criterion for a behaviour to be considered driven by future thinking (i.e., the temporal-
spatial separation between the future event and the current problem) and it is also questionable 
the extent to which subjects’ understanding and consideration of the future is needed in this 
task (see Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2020 for their take on these issues).   
3.2.Different conceptualizations of the past and the future  
As described above, the temporal cognitive mechanism is not consistently addressed in 
the tasks designed to test MTT in humans and great apes. Critically, when the temporal 
mechanism is addressed, the definition of the temporal mechanism differs across studies.  
(i) WWW paradigms. Martin-Ordas, Atance, and Caza (2017) have suggested that there 
is a crucial difference between the WWW paradigms with humans and the ones with the 
animals: whereas in the former, the “when” component is defined as the “order” in which the 
hiding events took place, in the studies with the scrub-jays and great apes, it is defined as “how 
long ago” a past event took place. To overcome this issue Martin-Ordas et al. (2017) presented 
3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds with a preferred food (i.e., popsicle) that was only edible after a short 
interval, and a less preferred food (i.e., raisins) that was edible after both short and long 
intervals. To make a successful choice, children had to remember “what” food item was hidden 
“where” as well as how much time had elapsed between the hiding of the two food items (i.e., 
“how long ago”). They only received 2 trials. Results showed that children chose their preferred 
food after the short intervals but, strikingly, did not select their less-preferred food after the 
long intervals. Consistent with previous findings, however, age-related changes in children’s 
ability to remember “what” was hidden “where” were found. However, children struggled at 
estimating the duration of the trials (i.e., “how long ago”)– a potential explanation for why they 
failed to make the correct choice in the WWW paradigm. A more controversial interpretation 
of Martin-Ordas et al.’s (2017) findings is that the WWW paradigm does not necessarily rely 
on episodic memory. When testing adults in the same paradigm, Martin-Ordas and Atance 
(2019) found that participants successfully took into account the retention interval when 
deciding whether to choose a non-perishable or perishable food - but only after having 
experienced the event once before. Therefore, these results question (1) the extent to which 
“how long ago” is a crucial component of episodic memory and (2) if it is a more primitive 
ability than the recollection of the order of the events, why then humans struggle to use this 
skill in WWW tasks. 
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(ii) Spoon Tests. A critical difference between most of the studies with children† and those 
with apes is that once children select the tool, they can use it immediately. In contrast, in the 
studies with animals the delay always happens after selecting the tool; that is, the tool is not 
for immediate use. Thus, it is unclear what the temporal parameters of the Spoon test are meant 
to be, since they have not been consistently implemented in the same way for children and 
animals. It also opens up the possibility that different cognitive abilities have been assessed in 
children and animals. 
In the next section, I present an overview of the main theories that have provided a 
critical view on the comparative work by questioning the extent to which the temporal 
cognitive mechanism has been addressed in the paradigms described in Section 2. 
 
4. Main theoretical criticisms 
Since the publication of the classical WWW paradigm (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), 
the field of MTT has been heavily divided between those who argue that animals’ abilities to 
remember past events and think about the future are somehow similar to those in humans (e.g., 
Clayton et al, 2003; Osvath & Martin-Ordas, 2014) and those who think that these abilities are 
uniquely human (e.g., Tulving, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). At the heart of this 
debate was whether animals have the same type of consciousness (i.e., autonoetic awareness) 
as humans do—leading to a clash between the phenomenological criterion and the use of 
behavioural measures. These discussions seem to have reached an impasse since the issue of 
whether animals (and preverbal children) have this type of consciousness cannot be empirically 
assessed—research in adults mainly rely on language-based paradigms (e.g., word lists; 
Tulving, 1972; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 2007). Below the main 3 frameworks 
together with the alternative temporal cognitive mechanisms suggested by each of them are 
outlined. 
4.1. The Stuck-in-Time hypothesis  
Roberts (2002; Roberts & Feeney, 2009) argued that a prerequisite for an organism to 
travel back and forwards in time is to have a concept of time. Such concept involves an 
understanding of (1) past events as having occurred at different points over a duration of time 
 
† Note that Redshaw and Suddendorf (2013) did include a short delay (i.e., 5 min) between selecting 
the tool and returning to the room where the problem was placed. However, Scarf et al. (2014) have argued that 
given the short delay and the fact that going back to the problem-room was what children were to do next, 
children’s choices could be explained in terms of their current motivational state (i.e., what they want right now 
rather than what they will want in the future). Another exception is Martin-Ordas’ two-step Spoon Test in which 
children could either select the tool before a delay of 15 min or after the delay. However, the results showed that 
children’s performance was not affected by “when” they could make their choices.  
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and (2) future events as events that will occur at different points over a duration of time. This 
is different from being able to keep track of time (Thorpe & Wilkie, 2006), time intervals 
(Roberts, 1981) or anticipate the outcomes of certain responses (Reynolds, 1968)—in fact, 
circadian cycles, internal accumulators of neural pulses or learning/semantic knowledge can 
account for animals’ behaviour in these studies. 
When it comes to the WWW paradigm, Roberts (2002) points out that performance in 
this paradigm has not been systematically interpreted as being driven by a single mechanism.  
For example, some studies describe animals as remembering “how long ago” between hiding 
food and retrieving it (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010), others as  “when” the food was hidden 
(Griffiths, Dickinson & Clayton, 1999) or as time elapsed since hiding the food (Clayton, Yu 
& Dickinson, 2001; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). Roberts and colleagues (Roberts & Feeney, 
2009; Roberts, Feeney, MacPherson, Petter, McMillan & Musolino, 2008) argue that the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying these types of memory are different: whereas memory for 
“when” involves a temporal dimension in which past events can be placed (i.e., episodic 
memory), memory for “how long ago” implies keeping track of temporal distance between 
events47—and, consequently, not episodic memory. Thus, under the Stuck-in-Time hypothesis 
the WWW paradigm is not necessarily a test of episodic memory because the “when” 
component is assessed as “how long ago.” In order to overcome this issue, Roberts and 
colleagues (2008) developed a test in which subjects—in this case, rats- could use different 
temporal cues to find food: “when” (e.g., the time of the day in which an event occurred), “how 
long ago” (i.e., time elapsed between events) or both “when+how long ago.” Rats were only 
able to use “how long ago” cues—suggesting that they can solve the WWW task by keeping 
track of time rather than by recollecting past events. Crucially, this study opens up the 
possibility that performance in the WWW paradigm does not require the same temporal 
cognitive mechanism than humans use when recollecting past events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Martin-Ordas et al., 2017; Martin-Ordas & Atance, 2019).   
The Stuck-in-Time hypothesis also applies to future thinking. In fact, Roberts and 
Feeney (2010) argued that, similar to the WWW paradigm, alternative explanations (e.g., 
species predispositions) can account for animals’ performance in the Spoon test. This is 
because this paradigm does not include a temporal mechanism that allows assessing whether 
animals can anticipate when—within a temporal framework- an event will happen. Thus, 
Roberts and Feeney (2010) claim that “anticipation of the most proximate event in a sequence 
of future events” (p. 52) is essential for demonstrating future planning. Osvath, Raby and 
Clayton (2010) critically responded to Roberts and Feeney’s (2010) suggestion by arguing that 
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“a sense of past and future is regarded as a defining factor of MTT, [but] the precise time 
sequencing […] is not” (p. 51). As yet, however, the question of whether animals can think 
about future events in a temporal framework that involves sequencing a series of events still 
remains open.  
4.2. Metarepresentational approach  
Redshaw (2014; see also Suddendorf 1999; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) argues that 
a crucial component of MTT is metarepresentation because it allows an organism to “represent 
the nature of the relationship between current reality and alternative representations of 
reality” (Redshaw, 2014; p. 1). As such, metarepresentational abilities allow an organism to 
represent the past and the future in relation to a representation of the current moment as well 
as to reflect on and evaluate representations of future events “according to the particular 
features of future representations” (Redshaw, 2014; p. 521); that is, an organism forming a 
mental representation of a future event should know that the representation of the future event 
could be wrong, and consequently, that the future event could have different alternative 
outcomes.  
Under the Metarepresentational account, animals and very young children might only 
be able of uncontextualized mental representations of past and future events (i.e., mental space 
travel). These representations are integrated by components of different memories, but in these 
cases the organism will fail (1) to establish a relation between them and the current reality and, 
consequently, (2) to embed these representations in a temporal context. Redshaw (2014) 
suggests that in the Spoon test subjects could have selected the correct tool without having any 
mental representation of the future event and, thus, without establishing the relation between 
the representation of the present moment and the representation of the future moment. 
Similarly, performance in the WWW task could also be described as being guided by 
uncontextualized mental representations. In both tasks, a cue (e.g., tools) triggers the 
representation of a past event (e.g., having seen/used the correct tool before)—which facilitates 
the correct response (e.g., selecting the correct tool). Thus, animals cannot locate past or future 
events in a temporal context because they lack the metarepresentational abilities that would 
allow them to do so. As Hoerl and McCormack (2019) suggest, in Redshaw’s view animals 
“can mentally meander through time even if they have no idea where in time their meandering 
takes them” (page 9). 
Recently, Redshaw and Suddendorf (2020; see also Redshaw, Bulley & Suddendorf, 
2019) have elaborated on this framework and suggested that recursion allows humans to embed 
different levels of mental representations when thinking about the past or the future [i.e., a 
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representation “with a particular temporal orientation (forward-looking or backward-looking) 
is represented as being located within another representational perspective with its own 
temporal orientation”, Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2020; p. 53]. They suggest a multilevel system 
varying in the degree of recursivity required to elaborate the temporal representation (e.g., 
imagining a future event in which we remember a past event that in the past had different future 
outcomes). In humans, this milestone is achieved after the development of the ability to prepare 
for mutually exclusive possibilities. Despite the level of complexity added to their framework, 
it is still unclear how temporal reasoning becomes critical for a creature to mentally travel in 
time. If we were to take their own example—putting away a second bottle of wine to prevent 
a hangover tomorrow- it is not clear why metarepresentation is required to make a decision 
(i.e., to not drink the second bottle) and, therefore, why making that decision cannot be based 
on an uncontextualized mental representation. Could not I just know that too much alcohol 
causes hangover? The question is, then, whether a simplified system would suffice to make 
these decisions and when/if recursion and meta-representational abilities are critical for MTT. 
 
4.3. Dual System: temporal updating and temporal reasoning 
Hoerl and McCormack’s (2019) approach differentiates between two systems: the 
temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system. The former is considered to 
represent objects as they are in their context (e.g., spatial location). When the objects change 
over time, this new information will be updated into the previous representation of the 
environment. Thus, in the temporal updating system—rather than representing that objects are 
different from what they were before- representations are simply amended/updated with the 
new information. As Hoerl and McCormack (2019) point out “the temporal updating system 
operates with a model of the world that concerns the world only ever as it is at present” (p. 2). 
However, the organism does need to maintain the information over time even when such 
information—about objects or locations- is not within perceptual scope. Single-trial learning, 
keeping track of elapsed time between events, sequential learning and anticipation are 
behaviours that can be performed by an organism with a temporal updating system.  
In contrast, the temporal reasoning system allows an organism to represent points in 
time (e.g., before-after relationships). These representations contain information about the 
current state of the world and from other temporal dimensions (e.g., past events). Consequently, 
the temporal reasoning system not only supports the representation of temporal order 
representations between events happening at different times but also the representations of the 
events in a temporal framework (e.g., tense)—past, present and future.  Thus, the crucial 
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difference between the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system is 
“concerned with what a creature can represent—i.e., whether or not its model of the world 
contains a temporal dimension” (p. 4). Hoerl and McCormack (2019) argue that representing 
the temporal aspect of the world is different from being sensitive to it.  
The Dual System approach has received important attention from a developmental 
approach.  Research has shown that children’s ability to use the recalled temporal information 
in past-oriented tasks seems to emerge only by age 5 (e.g., Hoerl & McCormack, 2011; 
McCormack & Hoerl, 2005, 2007; McColgan & McCormack, 2008; Povinelli, 2001). For 
example, McCormack and Hoerl (2007) presented 4- and 5-year olds with an object-location 
task. Children were introduced to two dolls (e.g., John and Peter) that always performed actions 
(e.g., brush their hair) in a specific order (e.g., John first, Peter last). In this task, correctly 
identifying the location of the object (e.g., brush) depended on the recollection of the order in 
which the two dolls acted. McCormack and Hoerl (2007) found that it is only by the age of 5 
that children can identify the location of the object. A similar developmental pattern has been 
found in relation to the use of temporal information in future-oriented tasks (e.g., Klahr & 
Robinson, 1981; McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Atance, 2011; McCormack 
& Hanley, 2011; Prabhakar & Hudson 2014; Scholnick, Friedman, & Wallner-Allen, 1997; 
Welsh, 1991). For example, McColgan and McCormack (2008) assessed preschoolers’ ability 
to reason about temporal order in a route-planning task. In this task, 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds were 
presented with a doll character that was planning to visit a toy zoo and wanted to take a picture 
of one of the animals (e.g., kangaroo). However, the doll did not have a bag to carry the camera. 
Children were asked to identify a location where the doll could leave the camera so she could 
pick it up before getting to the kangaroo location. McColgan and McCormack’s (2008) showed 
that 5-year-olds identified the correct locations to leave the camera, but 3- and 4-year-olds 
failed to do so (see also McCormack & Hanley, 2011). Altogether these studies show that the 
ability to reason about before-and-after relationships in tasks that involve achieving immediate 
goals improves between ages 3 and 5. 
 Critically, under the Dual System approach, performance in the WWW tasks and Spoon 
tests is not supported by the temporal reasoning system but by the temporal updating system. 
In the case of the WWW paradigm, Hoerl and McCormack (2019) claim that there is no need 
to remember a past event itself (e.g., caching/hiding food), instead a timing mechanism that 
can alter the creature’s representation of the world in a way that depends on how much time 
has elapsed since an event occurred (Hoerl & McCormack, 2011; McCormack, 2001).  This 
mechanism is just a temporal sensitivity—which facilitates temporally appropriate updating of 
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the representation of the world. Similarly, performance in the Spoon-test tasks—both in 
children and animals- do not require the representation of a future event. When selecting a tool, 
subjects’ representation of the task “is represented as existing somewhere in the [subjects’] 
current spatial environment, and in this sense as potentially accessible. Together with the 
motivational state of desiring the contents of the apparatus, this seems sufficient to explain why 
the animals choose the tool” (Hoerl & McCormack, 2019; p. 7).  Thus, under this approach 
there is no evidence of MTT in animals.  
   
5. Final remarks 
The theoretical accounts described in Section 4 suggest that different (and mutually 
exclusive) temporal mechanisms underlie MTT. What all three accounts agree on is that, so 
far, MTT has not been demonstrated in animals and that addressing its temporal cognitive 
mechanism is a crucial exercise if we are to understand the evolution and development of MTT. 
Critically, it is also unknown whether MTT is possible with more than one temporal cognitive 
mechanism and whether these temporal  mechanisms differ (or not) between episodic memory 
and future thinking. Thus, for a cognitive skill, Mental Time Travel, that surely involves a 
conception of the past and the future—and, consequently, a temporal mechanism that allows 
having an understanding of what the past and future might entail- research on its temporal 
aspect is still in its infancy (e.g., Zhan & Hudson, 2018 for a similar view).  
In addition, our current understanding of MTT is mostly based on studies carried out in 
different animal groups (e.g., great apes, corvids). However, comparative studies in which 
different species are tested under similar circumstances using the same experimental paradigms 
are mostly lacking. As mentioned in Section 3, there are also a number of methodological 
shortcomings (e.g., different temporal cognitive mechanisms tested across species and 
paradigms) in the paradigms developed to test MTT. This together with the use of different 
experimental paradigms and the lack of comparative and comparable data hinder our 
understanding of the phylogeny and ontogeny of MTT and its underlying temporal 
mechanisms.   
To move forward the field of MTT it is necessary to address the above-mentioned 
methodological and theoretical considerations. Developing experimental situations that allow 
us to clearly contrast different temporal mechanisms could be used as an starting point for 
 18 
investigating this issue both from a developmental and comparative approach‡.  As it currently 
stands, performance in the WWW and Spoon Test paradigms has been interpreted as not 
involving an understanding of past and the future. However the alternative explanation is also 
possible; that is, performance could well be driven by temporal reasoning skills (Hoerl & 
McCormack, 2019) or even by metarepresentational abilities (Redshaw, 2014). But the 
currently methodology does not allow to differentiate between these explanations: the 
behavioural outcome is the same (e.g., take the tool) regardless of the temporal mechanism that 
is at play. In the absence of paradigms with which to differentiate them, the differences between 
human and animals may still be based mechanisms postulated in post-hoc explanations (e.g., 
Hoerl & McCormack, 2019). Even if it were to be true that what differentiates human’s from 
other animals’ MTT abilities is the temporal cognitive mechanism (in whichever form), one 
would still need to explain how this (probably more elaborated) ability might have evolved. 
Whereas Redshaw (2014) and Roberts (2004) propose a single mechanism that makes MTT 
unique to humans (i.e., metarepresentation, “when” within a temporal framework), Hoerl & 
McCormack (2019) argue that animals are stuck with a more primitive mechanism that has to 
constantly be updated to keep up with the changes in the environment. But why would animals 
only have a temporal updating system—if so, all animals?- and humans would have a co-
existing temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system? What would the 
evolutionary pressures be for a system to develop two different temporal mechanisms?  
Recently, Moore (under review) has put forward a cultural theory for the development 
and evolution of theory of mind (i.e., mind-modelling). In Moore’s view, humans share with 
our closest relatives basic socio-cognitive skills that allow to track others’ goal-directed 
behaviours. Critically, it is the cultural evolution of linguistic tools that has favoured the 
development of different models to describe mental states—through evolution the least 
expressive tools progressively would have disappeared. Thus, linguistic tools would have 
caused differences in the representational complexity of others’ goal-directed behaviours 
between humans and animals. In addition, differences across cultures would arise in the way 
that these mental states are described (e.g., larger set of linguistic tools would allow the 
expression of finer differentiations between epistemic and conative states). 
 
‡ Note that Roberts (2002; Roberts & Feeney, 2009) has put forward two different experimental paradigms that 
could be used to test the concept of time (i.e., when) in humans and animals. Likewise, Hoerl & McCormack 
(2019) have suggested that Martin-Ordas’s (2018) two-step Spoon task could be adapted for use with animals in 
order to test the temporal reasoning system. 
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Moore’s view can easily be adapted to the issues discussed here. It is possible to argue 
that humans also share with other animals (e.g., great apes) basic cognitive abilities that allow 
them to represent the spatio-temporal content of previous or future events (e.g., Campbell 2006; 
Keven, 2016, 2019). Such basic temporal abilities might, for instance, be limited by the 
temporal proximity of the events—in the absence of cultural devices, such as calendars, clocks, 
timelines, it could be a struggle to represent a distant past or a distant future (see also Osvath 
& Martin-Ordas, 2014). In this sense, comparing great apes with Western humans could be 
confounding research on MTT. While the latter populations might be able to imagine what they 
will be doing in 10 years (e.g., buying a house), the former might only be able to foresee a 
closer future (e.g., where to build the nest tonight). Conducting studies in human populations 
with no access or with different levels of access to devices that allow keeping track of time 
might shed light on the extent to which being surrounded by and using such devices affect our 
future thinking abilities.  
Under this cultural account, it would also be conceivable that cultural practices played 
a critical role in the evolution of different ways to think about time. For example, Woodburn 
(1982) described mobile, egalitarian huntergatherer groups (e.g., Aka group living in Central 
African Republic) as “immediate- return” societies, and sedentary, “complex” hunter- 
gatherers (like those who lived along the northwestern coast of the United States), as well as 
farmers, as “delayed return” societies. Whereas the delayed- return societies are based on 
systems in which individuals wait, for example, up to 6 months for a return of an asset, in 
immediate return societies the return of the investment takes place almost immediately after 
the action (e.g., hunting). The cognitive consequences of living in a society in which one is 
always looking for food to eat within the next hours/ days, as opposed to a society in which 
one is planning which crop to plant next year, might be tremendous on MTT abilities—in 
particular on the temporal cognitive mechanisms driving MTT. If these practices affect the way 
humans think about the future, then we might be doing a feeble favour to the field of 
comparative psychology by not addressing the (possible) wide variety of temporal mechanisms 
across different (human) populations. 
Finally, and  similar to Moore’s account, the variability reported on temporal 
representations and temporal understanding in humans could have also resulted from cultural 
tools (e.g., cultural conventions, language; for a review Bender & Beller, 2014). Under this 
approach it would then be expected to find variation in the way, for example, time is described 
across different populations. We know that when speaking about time, people tend to do so 
using vocabulary from the spatial domain—this is because time is an abstract concept and we 
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make use of (mostly) spatial metaphors to conceptualize it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For 
example, in Spanish language the past is placed behind the speaker (e.g., the worst is behind 
us) and the future in front (e.g., the best is ahead of us; Boroditsky, 2011). In contrast, in 
Aymara the past is described as being in front of the speaker and the future as being behind 
(Núñez & Sweetser, 2003). In addition to express two different ways in which the past and the 
future can be described, this example also highlights cultural differences in the way we do so. 
Thus, it is arguable that language could shape the way we think about time (and perhaps enable 
different forms of temporal cognitive mechanisms; see Everett 2017 for a similar argument on 
the evolution of number cognition).  
Altogether, one, then, could argue that complexity and variation will come from the 
different ways in which culture (e.g., cultural practices, cultural constructions) and language 
shape our cognitive tools to reason about time. As a consequence, there could be uniquely 
human forms of temporal cognitive mechanisms—developed through language- that would 
facilitate thinking and reasoning about past or future events. Then, just as argued by Moore 
(under review), these cultural tools might have allowed us to extent our MTT abilities beyond 
those of other animal species.    
In closing, different frameworks have suggested different temporal mechanisms that 
are play in MTT. Whether MTT is possible with more than one mechanism and whether 
differences across species exist in this regard is still an open question. If humans and animals 
shared a basic temporal cognitive mechanism and cultural tools and language are responsible 
for the complexity in which humans think about time, then comparative and cross-cultural 
research would be critical to have a comprehensive understanding of what MTT entails.   
 
6. Conclusions 
The present review was motivated by the main question of the role that the 
understanding of time plays in the development and evolution of episodic memory and future 
thinking. I argue that addressing this issue will shed light on whether MTT is uniquely human, 
and whether species differences are related to the temporal cognitive mechanism guiding 
human and animals’ recollections and decisions about the future. I have also described 3 
theoretical models—each of them suggesting different temporal cognitive mechanisms that 
play a role in MTT-  as being critical models since they have all reinterpreted the animal work 
and argued that MTT is uniquely human. The three theoretical accounts described above claim 
that MTT is uniquely human because the cognitive mechanisms required to represent events in 
time emerge late in ontogeny and are lacking in other animals. I suggest that a basic way of 
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understanding time might be shared across species, however culture and language will play a 
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